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Abstract 
We propose two models of how a subject’s growing 
experience in a medium affects presence: The Spin model 
(based on Spinoza) which predicts that subjects begin as 
present and then learn to become non-present; and the SoD 
model (based on Coleridge) which predicts that subjects 
expend effort to suspend their disbelief during presence. In a 
longitudinal study, 47 subjects (divided randomly into an 
attention-focussing and attention-neutral group) were 
exposed to the same VE over three days, and measured with 
the ITC-SOPI after the first and final exposures, and then 
again after a 72 hour delay. The data show the attention-
neutral subjects experienced a slight increase in spatial 
presence, while the attention-focussed subjects showed no 
change over time. After the delay, the attention-focussing 
group experiences an increase in spatial presence and the 
attention-neutral group remains unchanged. We argue that 
this is, within the limits of the study, evidence for the Spin 
model. We conclude by discussing the theoretical and 
measurement implications of the models and results. 
 
Keywords--- Presence, Content, Cognition, Memory, 
Theory. 
 
1. Introduction 
Currently, the literature shows a good understanding of 
cross-sectional effects on presence, particularly with respect 
to the role of media factors on the experience (see [1] for a 
review). However, the number of studies covering 
longitudinal factors in presence is limited. Subject age (see 
for instance [2, 3]), and self-rated media experience  (such as 
[3, 4]) have been examined as covariates to presence, but 
longitudinal manipulations of presence are generally rare. 
This deficit extends into theory - none of the extant 
explanatory models of presence (such as [5-7]) provide a 
satisfactory prediction of what longitudinal effects might 
exist in presence. This paper presents two possible models of 
how an increase in one’s experience in a medium might 
affect the presence experience, as well as a first empirical 
study into longitudinal effects (such as medium 
accommodation) on presence. 
1.1 Two possible models: ‘Present unless disproved’ 
and ‘Suspension of disbelief’ 
It is perhaps easiest to understand our point of departure by 
contrasting Spinoza and Coleridge. From our point of view, 
Coleridge believed that cognition works to remove disbelief 
and to create presence: 
“so as to transfer from our inward nature a human 
interest and a semblance of truth sufficient to procure 
for these shadows of imagination that willing suspen-
sion of disbelief for the moment, which constitutes po-
etic faith”. [8] pp 168-169. 
Contrary to this view, Spinoza believed we naturally tend to 
be present unless we discover subsequently that the 
environment is false:  
“If the human body is affected by a mode
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 which in-
volves the nature of some external body, the human 
mind will regard that same external body as actually 
existent, or as present to it, until the body is affected 
by an affection which excludes the existence or pres-
ence of that body”. (Spinoza, Ethics Part Two, Propo-
sition 17, see [9] p132; emphasis added). 
Of these two ideas, Coleridge’s is perhaps the more 
accepted by presence researchers (the idea is explicitly 
mentioned in, for instance, [10, 11]). These two ideas 
however present competing explanations for how the 
presence experience changes over time for a subject.   
If one frames a “suspension of disbelief” (SoD) model 
from Coleridge, then one would expect subjects to expend 
mental effort to believe a VE; however, the purpose of VE 
design is often to reduce effort for the user – indeed, 
Lombard & Ditton have argued that presence is most likely 
to occur when the subject is processing the VE in an 
effortless way [12].  For longitudinal effects, the SoD model 
implies that if one experiences repeated exposure to a VE (or 
to very similar VEs), then there is no reason to suppose that 
suspending disbelief would become more difficult (in fact, 
one might expect it to become easier over time, if it is subject 
to practice effects). One might thus expect that when we are 
                                                           
1
 Spinoza’s doctrine of modes is beyond the scope of this 
paper, for our purposes one can perhaps read “mode” as 
“signifier”. 
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exposed to a VE repetitively over time, presence will either 
increase or remain constant.  
A Spinozan (Spin) model of belief implies an initial 
acceptance of the VE, and then, after being unable to 
incorporate the VE into other mental constructs, one could 
expect a decrease in the presence over the long term. In 
addition, the stronger the belief in an initial reality that is 
subsequently not matched by the VE, the more profound will 
be the rejection of the VE, and the more impoverished the 
presence experience. Note that under the Spin model, no 
effort is required to become present; it is the default position. 
This basic notion has some support in presence theory – Lee 
[13] has argued that presence occurs automatically without 
effort, and Jacobson [14] has similarly argued that presence 
(in literary contexts at least) occurs without conscious effort 
by the reader. Empirically, this model has some support from 
the findings in [3], which shows that as experience with a 
content area increases, presence tends to decrease.  
Of course, these are simple models which exclude many 
others factors which may come into play. For the sake of 
parsimony, this initial study examines only one factor: the 
consequences for presence over time depending of the extent 
to which attention is focussed on the objects in the VE. 
Attention is interesting in this context because of its potential 
impact on the information which the subject processes from 
the medium [15]. The effect of attention should be to 
increase the rate of rejection of the false notion under the 
Spin model, while under the SoD model attention should 
have a neutral or perhaps positive effect (see 1.2 below for a 
discussion of these possible effects). 
Implicit in the arguments presented above is that presence 
beliefs exist over time (or, alternatively, that presence 
experiences can be stored in long-term memory, and 
subsequently retrieved). Thus we assume that one can 
legitimately ask about a presence experience some time after 
the actual VE experience, and get a reasonable approximation 
to the actual experience (this is supported by the methods 
used in [3, 16]). Such questions are less legitimate if one 
believes that presence is a binary state of consciousness (such 
as expressed in [17]). This assumption relates to the corollary 
to Proposition 17 (quoted above) where Spinoza states:  
“The mind will be able to regard, as if they were present, 
external bodies by which the human body was once 
affected, even though they neither exist nor are present” 
[9], p132. 
This raises interesting questions of how memory affects, if 
not presence itself, then presence measures. 
1.2 Predictions for the Spin and SoD models 
There is substantial evidence to suggest that a subject’s 
previous knowledge of a content area can lower presence 
scores [3]. It is not clear, however, if this effect extends to 
knowledge of the medium. Repeated exposure to the medium 
might lead the subject to learn to pick out the limits and 
rendering artefacts of the medium, while focussing attention 
on the medium might enable subjects to more easily spot 
such artefacts, and thereby reduce presence.  
Under the Spin model, all information is initially accepted 
and only later rejected as mental effort is expended and 
shows that the information is incompatible with other beliefs. 
Thus, under repeated exposure presence should decrease. The 
SoD model makes no such prediction. 
If being present is the default position (Spin model) and 
effort has to be expended to reject it then one might expect 
that if attention is focussed on the environment it will 
increase the Spin effect and that presence will decrease.  
If on the contrary disbelief is the default position (SoD 
model) and effort has to be expended to attain presence then 
one might expect presence to increase with attention, or at 
least remain constant. 
2. Procedure 
We conducted an initial study to see how presence is 
affected by repeated exposure, and if that interacts with 
attention being focussed on the VE. We used the data from 
the False Memory Study (see elsewhere in these proceedings) 
and analysed those data for longitudinal and attention effects.  
2.1 Measures 
Presence was measured using the ITC Sense of Presence 
Inventory (ITC-SOPI) [4]. This questionnaire measures four 
factors of the presence experience: Spatial presence (a sense 
of being in the space), engagement (psychological 
engagements with the content and enjoyment of the 
experience), naturalness (congruency with real-world 
experience or a sense of realism) and negative effects 
(eyestrain, fatigue, simulator sickness, etc.). The ITC-SOPI 
was chosen as its factorial structure allows the measurement 
not only of spatial presence but also more strongly semantic 
factors such as a subject’s connection with the content, and 
their evaluation of the realism. This allows for great 
flexibility and range in the interpretation of the subject’s 
experience. 
2.2 Sample and design 
We sampled 47 subjects, university students, 19 women 
and 28 men (age M = 19.93, S = 1.83). We did not, for this 
study, select subjects for a particular level of medium 
experience, nor did we measure previous media experience 
(in two large studies of computer gamers [3, 16], previous 
medium experience proved to be an unreliable predictor of 
presence experiences). We did however control for the 
environment they experienced by using a VE which the 
subjects had not previously experienced (As the ITC-SOPI 
measures experiences in particular environments and not in 
particular systems, we reasoned that it should still be possible 
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to detect learning effects even if previous medium experience 
is a factor). 
Subjects came in for four sessions. The first session was 
preceded by a brief training session on an unrelated VE. The 
first three sessions were conducted on successive days before 
a weekend and the final session was held following an 
extended break of 72 hours.  The subjects experienced the 
same VE in each of the first three sessions for fifteen minutes 
(see 2.3 and 2.3.1 below for a description of the VE and 
tasks). There was no VE experience session after the 72 hour 
break. The ITC-SOPI questionnaire  [4] was administered 
after sessions 1 and 3 and after the break. The SUS 
questionnaire [18] was administered after session 2 in order 
to break expectations regarding questionnaires (it was not 
analysed).  
We randomly divided our sample into two groups: an 
attention-focussed group who were given a short set of VE 
content questions to test their memory of the VE immediately 
after each experience, and an attention-neutral group who did 
not receive any questions. We reasoned that the repetition of 
the test after each session would focus their attention of 
subjects on the VE content. We did not analyse the memory 
question data for this study. 
After a 72 hour delay, both groups were asked to recall 
their VE experience during the third day, and to respond to 
the ITC-SOPI with that experience in mind.  
2.3 Apparatus 
The study ran on four desktop computers with the same 
hardware configuration, which produced a measured update 
rate in the experimental VE ranging between 17Hz and 28Hz 
at a resolution of 1024x768. The study was run in a dedicated 
room, which was kept quiet and dark during the duration of 
the study. The machines were arranged such each subject 
could only see their own machine during the experiment. 
2.3.1 Virtual environment 
 The VE used simulated an egocentric interactive 
building walkthrough using the Quake Keys interface [19]. 
The VE represented a medieval European monastery,  
containing nineteen rooms spread over three levels of two 
buildings. Subjects performed an object search and collection 
task; in each session they searched for a different object 
(books, candlesticks or small chests) which were placed in 
different locations in each run. 
3. Results 
3.1 Repetition effects 
Each of the four ITC-SOPI factors were analysed using a 
two-way factorial analysis of variance, with session (1
st
 and 
3
rd
 session scores) and attention condition as factors – the 
session factor was within subjects, while the attention factor 
was between subjects. 
3.1.1.1 Spatial factor 
No main effect was found for either the attention factor ( 
F(1, 45) = 0.370, p < 0.543 ), or session ( F(2, 90) = 1.31, p < 
0.258 ). However, there was a significant interaction effect ( 
F(2, 90) = 10.21, p < 0.003 ). A set of post-hoc Fisher’s LSD 
tests revealed that the difference was a modest increase in 
spatial scores between the sessions, for the attention-neutral 
group only. 
3.1.1.2 Engagement factor 
No main effect was found for either the attention factor ( 
F(1, 45) = 0.042, p < 0.838 ), or session ( F(2, 90) = 0.054, p 
< 0.817 ). There was also no significant interaction effect ( 
F(2, 90) = 0.496, p < 0.485 ).  
3.1.1.3 Naturalness factor 
Again, no main effect was found for either the attention 
factor ( F(1, 45) = 0.113, p < 0.739 ), or session ( F(2, 90) = 
1.492, p < 0.230 ). There was also no significant interaction 
effect ( F(2, 90) = 0.526, p < 0.593 ).  
3.1.1.4 Negative effects factor 
No main effect was found for either the attention factor ( 
F(1, 45) = 0.014, p < 0.905 ), or session ( F(2, 90) = 0.052, p 
< 0.821 ). There was also no significant interaction effect ( 
F(2, 90) = 3.305, p < 0.088 ).  
3.2 Delay effects 
The next set of analyses focused on differences between 
each of the four ITC-SOPI factors over the 72 hour delay. 
Again, we used a two-way factorial analysis of variance, with 
delay (at-event and post-delay measures) and attention 
condition as factors – the delay factor was within subjects, 
while the attention factor was between subjects.  
3.2.1.1 Spatial factor 
No main effect was found for either the attention factor ( 
F(1, 45) = 1.119, p < 0.279 ), or session ( F(2, 90) = 0.978, p 
< 0.328 ). As for the repetition manipulation, there was a 
significant interaction effect ( F(2, 90) = 6.036, p < 0.018 ). 
A set of post-hoc Fisher’s LSD tests revealed that the 
difference was a modest increase in spatial scores over the 
delay, for the attention-focussed group only. 
3.2.1.2 Engagement factor 
No main effect was found for the attention factor ( F(1, 
45) = 0.288, p < 0.594 ). However, there was an effect for 
delay ( F(2, 90) = 0.376, p < 0.05 ), with engagement scores 
being marginally higher post-delay. There was no interaction 
effect ( F(2, 90) = 0.001, p < 0.981 ).  
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3.2.1.3 Naturalness factor 
This factor behaves similar to the engagement factor: No 
main effect was found for the attention factor ( F(1, 45) = 
0.120, p < 0.914 ), but a significant difference for delay ( F(2, 
90) = 9.112, p < 0.004 ), with naturalness scores being 
marginally higher post-delay. There was no significant 
interaction effect ( F(2, 90) = 0.590, p < 0.162 ).  
3.2.1.4 Negative effects factor 
No main effect was found for the attention factor ( F(1, 
45) = 0.134, p < 0.716 ), or delay ( F(2, 90) = 0.590, p < 
0.447 ). There was also no significant interaction effect ( F(2, 
90) = 2.025, p < 0.432 ).  
3.3 Accumulated ITC-SOPI error over delay 
To estimate the error which the event-measure delay 
incurs on the ITC-SOPI, simple correlations between ITC-
SOPI scores at the event and after the 72 hour delay. The R
2
 
values show a very high fit (low decay over the interval) 
between the scores: Spatial R
2
 = 0.91, Engagement R
2 
= 0.76, 
Naturalness R
2 
= 0.72, Negative effects R
2 
= 0.69.  
4. Discussion 
The duration of this study (three exposures) was likely 
too short to bring out major longitudinal effects; an extension 
of this study would be required before definitive conclusions 
could be reached about longitudinal effects in presence. 
Nevertheless, the sample used was large enough to draw 
some valid conclusions of shorter term effects as 
investigated. The most interesting result was the very high 
correlation between presence scores before and after the 
delay in measurement; this shows that the experience of 
presence is a long-lasting belief which is encoded in memory 
and decays slowly. It also shows that self-report measures are 
capable of measuring accurately after a delay (see 4.2 below). 
4.1 Support for predictions 
Although the ITC-SOPI measures four factors, only one 
of them (spatial presence) is non-controversial; it overcomes 
the argument presented by Slater in [20], and is conceptually 
common with other measures of presence such as the PQ 
[21], MEC-SPQ [22] and TPI [23]; our findings for this 
factor thus probably generalize well across measures. The 
findings themselves are suggestive of interesting longitudinal 
effects:  
1. The attention-neutral group showed an increase in spatial 
presence scores from exposure 1 to exposure 3 - see 
3.1.1.1. The attention-focussed group (who had their 
attention focussed by the memory questions) showed no 
differences over repeated exposures. 
2. The attention-focussed group showed an increase in 
spatial presence scores after the 72 hour delay - see 
3.2.1.1. (there were also small delay effects for the 
engagement and naturalness factors). 
The first finding can be explained if one considers 
interface effects as well as presence effects in the subjects’ 
interactions with the VE. Initially, VE navigation becomes 
more familiar as the subject learns to use the system, and that 
enhances presence (this is interface effect on presence is 
predicted by [12], and is supported, albeit across conditions 
and not longitudinally, in [24]). Any differences between the 
SoD and Spin models would probably only become apparent 
after this initial human-system interaction artefact is 
overcome. However, when one considers the lack of a similar 
effect in the attention-focussed group, then some indirect 
support for the Spin model becomes apparent. Recall that 
under the Spin model, attention is predicted to accelerate the 
rate of rejection of false information, and therefore to reduce 
presence. The fact that the attention-focussed group saw no 
increase in presence after repeated exposure (as one would 
expect as they are also learning the interface and becoming 
used to the system) suggests that their scores are in fact 
decreased as compared to the attention-neutral group. To 
make this conclusion more definitive, future studies should 
include measures of interface familiarity before the first VE 
exposure and after the last exposure, so that this can be 
factored out in the analysis.  
The spatial presence findings are also in general 
agreement with the findings of Gerrig who employs a 
metaphor of transport in the study of literary narratives 
(which is uncannily similar to the concept generally accepted 
by the presence community – see [25]). Gerrig argues that 
transport correlates with a lack of a critical attitude towards 
the information presented in a story. He adopts a position of 
“the willing construction of disbelief” ([25], p230, our 
emphasis) in a narrative world which he supports with the 
explicitly Spinozan results of Gilbert [26]. Gilbert makes the 
point that  
“Organisms immediately believe what they see and 
only question their percepts subsequently and 
occasionally. … Perception, then, is quintessentially 
Spinozan… As perception construes objects, so 
cognition construes ideas. In both cases, the 
representation of a stimulus (an object or idea) is 
believed that is, empowered to guide behaviour as if it 
were true--prior to a rational analysis of the 
representation's accuracy.” [26], p107. 
Several interesting questions are brought up by our 
findings which require investigation, particularly with regard 
to the increase in presence after the 72 hour delay exhibited 
by the attention-focussed group. For the SoD model, this may 
suggest that disbelief requires continuous effort; therefore, 
after 72 hours of not exerting disbelief, the effect fades. For 
the Spin model, this may indicate that at the time the subjects 
recall their experiences, due to a lack of any actual stimuli 
against which to test their beliefs, they fail to reject them and 
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therefore have a better presence experience. Further 
empirical work will be needed to clarify these questions. 
4.2 Stability of ITC-SOPI over repetition and delay 
A useful secondary finding relates to the temporal 
stability and test-retest reliability of the ITC-SOPI. Although 
the authors of the scale stress that it be used as soon as 
possible after the VE experience [4], our data suggests that 
even after a 72 hour delay, the scale retains a surprising 
amount of accuracy (see 3.3 above). Similarly, the scale is 
extremely robust over repeated measures of the same 
environment, for all subscales; the repetition factor was not 
significant in any of the models we tested (see 3.1 above). As 
our design included an ITC-SOPI measure after three 
exposures to the same environment, we can conclude, with 
some certainty, that the scale is proof to novelty effects; and 
because the two measurements were spaced over 48 hours, 
we can say with some certainty that it is robust against 
subjects recalling their original responses and repeating the, 
(of course, the size of the scale – 44 items – defends against 
this also). We would urge other scale developers to evaluate 
their scales on similar designs, so as to facilitate the study of 
longitudinal effects on presence.  
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